China has pursued a strategy of competition among government-owned organizations, and it initiated two government-owned constellation projects, Hongyun and Hongyan, in 2018. In April 2020, China’s National Development and Reform Commission included “satellite internet” on its “new infrastructures” list, and China applied to the ITU for a new constellation, called GW. Hongyun and Hongyan were dropped, and GW, also called China Satnet or Guowang, emerged as China’s global Internet service provider and it was followed by two others, Qianfan and Honghu-3. These are all far behind Starlink, but they will have protected markets and China is developing new launch vehicles and satellite manufacturing capacity.
Gwowang
China’s 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025) for National Economic and Social Development and Long-Range Objectives Through the Year 2035 called for building an integrated communications, Earth observation, and satellite navigation system with global coverage. Guowang is the constellation they called for.
Guowang consists of two sub-constellations, designated GW-A59 (6,080 satellites) and GW-2 (6,912 satellites). GW-2 will orbit at 1,145 km, and GW-A59 will orbit around half that. The ITU filing was in September of 2020, and after a long delay, the first ten GW-2 satellites were launched at the end of 2024, and they now have 81 in orbit. The cadence has picked up recently -- China just launched another batch of Guowang satellites. This was the ninth Guowang launch this year and the sixth in the last 30 days. Even at this cadence, it is unclear that they can manufacture and launch enough satellites to meet the ITU launch deadlines. Perhaps the Chinese have decided that, given launch and manufacturing resources, they would not be able to meet ITU deadlines for all of their constellations, so they are focusing on Guowang, which can be seen as most critical for the government.
Little technical information is available, but considering the capacities of the various rockets used to launch Guowang satellites and the number of satellites in each launch, it seems there are two sizes of satellite: large satellites of around 16,600 kg and smaller satellites of around 889 kg. While these are imprecise estimates, they indicate two classes of satellite with different capabilities and functions. (Note that the relatively high altitude GW-2 sub-constellation has both large and small satellites).
Several Guowang test satellites have also been launched, suggesting strategic government and military applications like Signals intelligence, positioning, navigation, and imaging applications in addition to Internet service.
Qianfan
Shanghai Spacecom Satellite Technology (SSST), a private company backed by the Shanghai municipal government and the Chinese Academy of Sciences, is developing the Qianfan constellation. The planned satellites will orbit at 1,160 km, which is higher than the other announced LEO satellite competitors except Telesat. While this will increase latency, collision risk, satellite lifespan, handoff frequency, and coverage footprint should improve.
Their plan called for 648 satellites providing regional service by the end of 2025 and global service with a second 648 satellites by the end of 2027. By 2030, they planned to have 15,000 satellites in orbit and offer direct-to-mobile service, but it does not look like they will make these goals.
It's been a year since the first Qianfan launch, but five months since the last one. Is the slowdown due to satellite or launch availability, or are they pausing for some redesign, or both? Blaine Curcio reports that they are “having a very hard time finding rockets to send full batches of 18 satellites to orbit, but they have also had operational problems. The upper stage of the first launch fragmented, creating over 300 pieces of trackable debris, and ninety satellites are in orbit, but fourteen have not reached their operational altitude. Furthermore, the satellites are interfering with astronomy, and some are tumbling. Regardless of the cause for delays, Qianfan is unlikely to meet its ITU launch deadlines.
Qianfan is a more direct competitor to Starlink than Guowang, which is primarily focused on domestic telecommunications and national security. SSST has been actively marketing wholesale service through foreign telecom companies under the Sailspace brand name. They had MOUs with several nations in six initial target markets, as shown below, and they have subsequently been actively marketing in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
Honghu-3
Landspace Technology Corporation was founded in 2015, following a 2014 central government policy shift that opened the launch and small satellite sectors to private capital. Landscape owns 48% of Hongqing Technology, which is developing the 10,000-satellite Honghu-3 constellation. Honghu-3 satellites will be in six planes, ranging from 340-550 km.
Landspace has a pending IPO and is developing the Zhuque-3 rocket, which they plan to launch later this year. The Zhuque-3 will carry about 21,000 kg to LEO in an expendable configuration – less than an expendable Falcon 9, but more than a reusable Falcon 9. This connection to a rocket manufacturer is reminiscent of SpaceX's relationship with Starlink and Project Kuiper's with Blue Origin. (Several other Chinese companies are also working on reusable rockets).
Honghu-3 was announced after Guowang and Qianfan, and relatively little is known of their plans and technology, but Landspace has valuable experience as a private company. As you see in this conversation with ChatGPT, Landscape has a complex mix of private, state and local government investors dating back to its founding, and it estimates the ownership breakdown as roughly 60% private, central government 15-20%, and provincial/municipal around 20%.
